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Joseph Stalin embodies the idea of a totalitarian dictator influenced by few and 
challenged by none. This view of Stalin’s role in Soviet history has proven incorrect in many 
respects since the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening up of Soviet archives to scholars 
around the world. The event that most demonstrated the lack of homogeneity within the Soviet 
government and the persistence of resistance to Stalin’s complete authority is the forced 
collectivization of agriculture. Soviet collectivization was an ambitious plan and for Stalin one of 
the most controversial policy initiatives he would pursue. Ultimately, the documentary record 
reveals that the agricultural policies that Stalin endorsed, which led to full scale collectivization, 
were not the product of a monolithic government ran by Stalin, but rather were contested at 
nearly every stage of development from 1928 through 1934. 
The struggle over ensuring the proper amount of food for the Soviet Union had been a 
problem since before the 1917 revolution. The way Vladimir Il’ich Lenin chose to pursue 
agricultural policies displayed this contentious issue for Soviet leaders since the creation of the 
Soviet Union. The Civil War of 1918-1921 posed a unique challenge for Lenin as domestic 
warfare would often disrupt the agricultural progress of the nation. In a letter to N.A. Rozhkov in 
1919 Lenin revealed his strategy for procuring food from peasant farmers during these years: 
“[i]f, instead of serenading free trade, the nonparty intelligentsia or the intelligentsia close to the 
party would form emergency groups, small groups, and unions for all-around assistance to the 
food supply, it would seriously help the cause and lessen hunger.”1 Lenin’s comments to 
Rozhkov served as a euphemistic description of a practice that would extend beyond abolishing 
free trade to include forced seizure of grain from the peasantry and the instatement of a food 
rationing system. This economic system came to be known as War Communism. Although the 
system of War Communism was instated as a response to food shortages largely due to the 
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disruption of the Civil War, these practices remained unpopular among the peasantry and largely 
inefficient in fostering good relationships between the industrial centers, the central party and the 
rural peasantry. 
 Furthermore, War Communism proved unsustainable as poor harvests in 1920 and 
general discontent over grain seizures led to a variety of peasant uprisings. These developments 
caused Lenin to consider a pragmatic solution to the political and economic turmoil facing the 
Soviet Union in 1921 by developing what became known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
Lenin and Viacheslav Molotov discussed one of the basic tenets of this system in a telegram in 
July of 1921 which stated that, “[t]he chief condition for resolving the food crisis lies in the 
successful collection of taxes in [the form of] food.”2 This tax in kind was not the only aspect of 
NEP and the reintroduction of a limited free market also became a major component for solving 
economic problems. These measures had positive effects on the peasantry as they observed grain 
prices reach pre-Great War levels and their standard of living recovered.  
Within this new system there also began to develop certain segments of society that 
profited from the capitalist elements of the NEP economy. One main group of people who 
profited off of this system were referred to as NEPmen. NEPmen were essentially speculators 
who sold scarce goods to various groups of people in the city centers and countryside. In 
addition to NEPmen, peasants also began to assert some form of economic independence as 
many peasant farmers began to withhold grain from the market to fetch higher prices or simply 
used their harvests to fatten up livestock. The development of NEP did stabilize the Soviet 
economic system in a time of great crisis, but the advent of NEPmen and peasants who could 
manipulate the market would also become concerning for the Soviet government as the era of 
NEP moved on. 
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The central party would also be faced with a crisis that was the opposite of what had been 
experienced in the years prior to the stabilization of the agricultural sector. By 1923, as 
foodstuffs became relatively more available, food production began to outpace the production of 
industrial goods, which led to a rise in prices of industrial goods and a devaluation of agricultural 
goods. The growing difference between these indexes became what Lev Trotsky referred to as 
the ‘scissors crisis.’ This had a great impact on the peasantry forcing many to revert to 
subsistence farming or refrain from selling their grain altogether due to the poor exchange value 
it had with industrial goods by this time. The actions of much of the peasantry left industrial 
centers particularly vulnerable to the peasant’s will in this respect. Although short term fixes for 
the split between the prices of industrial and agricultural goods would be created, these problems 
would not cease and furthermore would be issues that Stalin faced as he asserted his political 
dominance towards the end of the 1920s. 
This crisis was compounded by a focal point of the Bolshevik party throughout the period 
of NEP which centered on creating industrial growth in the Soviet Union following the 
destruction caused by the Great War, the 1917 Revolution and subsequent Civil War. A debate 
that developed within the party over how to achieve progress in the industrial sector did not 
differ in kind but only degree because the Bolsheviks all agreed that the peasantry would provide 
the revenue necessary to build an industrial base. Nevertheless, by 1924 an industrialization 
debate developed that would not be resolved until Stalin consolidated his control over the 
economic apparatus of the Soviet Union in 1928. This debate was polarized by the left and right 
wings of the Bolshevik party. The rightists were made up of Politburo members Nikolai 
Bukharin, Alexey Rykov and Mikhail Tomskii and championed the policies of NEP, which 
relied on a taxation of the peasantry to ensure state revenue. The left wing included Politburo 
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members Lev Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev and the economist Evgenii 
Preobrazhenskii, all of whom felt that state intervention, which would set the prices the state 
would pay for agriculture lower than the world market and also set industrial prices artificially 
high, was the proper economic course to procure revenue for industrializing the Soviet Union. 
This form of accumulating capital was in contention with NEP as it attacked the free market and 
restricted the peasant’s ability to market their own grain. Stalin allied with the right wing for 
political reasons as his thesis of ‘socialism in one country’ confronted the ideology, created by 
Lenin and embraced by Trotsky and to a lesser extent the left wing of the Bolshevik party, that 
the socialist revolution needed to spread internationally. However, Stalin never entirely agreed 
with the right as he felt a focus on heavy industry, which was a position of the left, was more 
important than the rightists’ strategy of focusing on small scale manufacturing of consumer 
goods. Stalin and Bukharin emerged victorious over their political opposition, but the political 
infighting concerning the proper economic policies for the Soviet Union was far from over.  
By 1927 the inadequacies of NEP had become apparent when considering the 
deficiencies between needed grain reserves and the actual amount being collected by the state. 
Roberta T. Manning estimates that by December “only one-third of annual domestic food 
requirements (220.2 million poods of grain) had been secured from the 1927 harvest, compared 
to 340.1 million poods the previous year.”3 The problem with food distribution existed as only 
one dilemma that Stalin was faced with in 1927, but concerned the Soviet leader immensely. The 
solutions that Stalin would soon seek out drastically altered the landscape of Soviet agriculture 
and proved to have deleterious effects on much of the peasantry. 
 A report from the OGPU4 regarding concerns in the countryside in the summer of 1927 
because of a war scare revealed another quandary for Stalin. The document regarded a war scare 
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in 1927 that evolved from diplomatic shortcomings between the Soviet Union and Britain, China 
and Poland, which left many people in the Soviet countryside fearful of the prospect of 
international conflict. The report revealed that, “[p]anic can be seen among Cossacks in the 
village of Pavlovskoe, Krymsk Raion, in connection with the rumors of war. Instances in which 
horses and cattle are sold off have been noted, and silver money is being hidden.”5 The 
information presented by the OGPU described some shortcomings of NEP that Stalin’s economic 
plan would have to confront. The first problem that became apparent surrounded the way that the 
free market allowed peasants to sell their goods in the event that they might lose them for a war 
effort or some other campaign by the state, which left the Soviet Union’s food supply vulnerable 
to the peasant farmers’ will. Furthermore, under NEP peasants could hoard away goods and 
money in the hopes of it gaining value in the future. For these reasons the war scare of 1927 
underscored the specific areas that Stalin and his supporters would have to focus on in order to 
form a solid agricultural infrastructure that could lead to full-scale collectivization. 
 The argument against the free market system did not solely rest on the problems that the 
war scare created. Stalin’s advisors also revealed that there were fundamental problems with the 
free market in general. A telegram from the OGPU stated that, “[s]peculators extract large profits 
from the sale of goods in short supply at inflated prices at markets with abnormally high demand, 
allocate the funds received in this manner to procurements and disorganize the procurement 
markets through excessive increases in set prices, which in a number of cases brings about a 
sharp drop in state and cooperative procurements.”6 The problem that the telegram from the 
OGPU discussed could trace its roots back to the development, within the outlines of NEP, 
which allowed peasants and NEPmen to distort market prices by hoarding scarce goods for 
eventual sale at inflated prices. In the context proposed by the OGPU this practice proved 
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detrimental to state procurements as the state was forced to adhere to the prices set by these 
speculators. This was another concern that would lead Stalin to turn against NEP, positioning 
himself against Bukharin and focusing on strategies to target a class of peasants that were known 
as kulaks. 
The kulak class was seen as the most economically affluent of peasant society. The idea 
of a kulak class came from Lenin viewing the peasant stratum as a Marxist class based society in 
microcosm. Therefore, kulaks filled the bourgeois class and the rest of peasant society was 
divided into middle and poor peasant classes. The term kulak took on a highly politicized role, 
which allowed the term to be applied in a fashion that never described a definitive group within 
peasant society. Nevertheless, kulaks became a major point of focus for Stalin because he 
believed that their access to more agricultural goods than the rest of the peasantry put them in a 
unique position to influence agricultural prices by withholding agricultural goods until prices 
were raised in much the same way described by the OGPU’s report on speculators. Stalin also 
used this term as a way to demonize specific members of peasant communities found to be 
undesirable to the state. The political nature of this term and the wide variety of peasants who 
could be labeled kulaks displayed the elasticity of the kulak moniker. The kulak label eventually 
allowed the state to use this term to intimidate large segments of the peasant community during 
various collectivization drives by attaching harsh penalties to the crime of being a kulak. Due to 
the negative connotations of this term, punishments of kulaks were rarely seen as being negative 
by party members, but were questioned in relation to how this would affect the middle and poor 
peasant classes.  
 Kulaks would become a major point of focus for Soviet leaders, but only as part of a 
larger economic plan that Stalin had for the Soviet Union in 1928.  Stalin’s economic plan 
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depended heavily on grain reserves, and it demonstrated why focusing on the peasant 
communities became a focal point for the Soviet government under Stalin. A speech by Stalin in 
1928 revealed the path he wished to pursue. Stalin first described the difference between the 
Soviet Union and capitalist nations by stating that, “[i]n capitalist countries industrialization was 
usually based not only on internal accumulation but also on the plundering of other countries, the 
plundering of colonies or vanquished countries, or on substantial loans from abroad…All of this 
is being done in our country on the basis of internal accumulation.”7 Although Stalin’s view of 
the way to industrialize depended on the proletariat and peasant classes, the strategies that led to 
forced collectivization would focus solely on the latter. Stalin described the role of peasant 
farmers in this system by stating that, “it pays the state not only ordinary taxes, direct and 
indirect, but it also pays relatively high prices for goods from industry—that is first of all—and it 
does not receive the full value of the prices of agricultural products—that is second of all.”8 This 
focus revealed various ways that Stalin’s first Five Year Plan, which focused on rapid 
industrialization, would be dependent on the grain reserves that could be obtained by the peasant 
class. Stalin’s plan resembled that of the previously defeated leftists, in that the Soviet 
government would attain revenue through setting the prices the state would pay the peasantry for 
foodstuffs at below market cost, and underscored the measures that he was willing to enforce on 
the peasantry to guaranty industrial progress. The taxation on the peasants would continue, but 
government control over the price of agricultural goods became central components of Stalin’s 
economic plan.  
The industrialization focus was central to Stalin’s economic plan. However, Stalin also 
goes on to state that, “[w]e must have a certain minimum of reserves at our disposal if we want 
to defend the positions of Soviet power both domestically and abroad.”9 The war scare of 1927 
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would have been fresh in Stalin’s mind and his use of the peasantry for domestic security also 
served as a plan to ensure the Soviet Union could withstand potential attacks from the capitalist 
nations abroad. This arrangement laid out by Stalin also relied heavily on peasant labor, which 
ideally provided a model where vast amounts of resources could be extracted from the peasant 
class.  
The peasantry alone could not provide food security for the Soviet Union under NEP, and 
Stalin felt the way to reverse this trend and ensure a large amount of state grain reserves hinged 
on pursuing the collectivization of agriculture. The collective farms, or kolkhozy, would rely on 
tractors and large machinery in order to mechanize the farming process and ensure that large 
amounts of food would be produced. Although the idea of solving state grain reserve problems 
by focusing on collective farms had broad acceptance within the party, the methods used to 
implement this strategy were contentious, which required a tempered approach. Stalin subverted 
the restrictions created by a need to consult with central party officials and encouraged a 
collective farm movement by making a trip to Siberia in January of 1928, during which he 
chided local officials for their softness against kulaks and instructed them to encourage the 
collectivization of agriculture. Although not official policy or endorsed by the Politburo, these 
instructions were the beginning of Stalin’s attempts to ensure the collectivization of all Soviet 
agriculture. The focus on collectivization would become a massive mobilization of peasant labor, 
but in 1928 forced collectivization of agriculture throughout the Soviet Union did not embody a 
homogeneous party policy and peasants joining collective farms was seen by the government as 
a largely voluntary endeavor.  
Collectivization was not the only goal of Stalin during his trip to Siberia and the focus 
these agricultural plans would have on liquidating the kulak class was made clear. A Central 
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Committee (CC) directive in January of 1928 stated that, “[i]n order to restore our price policy 
and achieve a serious turnaround, we must strike at resellers and kulaks right now, we must 
arrest speculators, kulaks, and other disrupters of the market and price policy.”10 This policy of 
aggressively targeting the peasants who profited from the free market contains the early signs of 
the path that Stalin and his supporters would follow regarding agriculture and was foreshadowed 
in the Party’s industrialization debate of 1924-1928. In addition to taxation, the CC directive 
revealed that the state was seeking price controls and to eradicate kulaks through punishments 
that included confiscations of property. These confiscations were often justified by referring to 
article 107 of the criminal code, which allowed for confiscations of a criminal’s property. The 
elasticity of the term kulak and the implementation of these harsh penalties would not only 
achieve Stalin’s goal of liquidating the kulak class, but came to be used as a tool of state 
repression that would ultimately assist the state in future campaigns to forcefully collectivize 
agriculture and procure food supplies from the peasantry. 
These controversial economic policies that Stalin encouraged created much political 
fallout. As early as January of 1928 the central party was already receiving reports from political 
figures that challenged Stalin’s campaign, which relied on peasants as a sort of human resource 
for capital extraction. The treatment of kulaks became especially controversial. The central 
party’s instructions for local officials were revealed in a CC directive in January of 1928. It 
stated that, “[w]hen arrears are collected on any kind of payments, harsh penalties be imposed 
immediately, above all against the kulaks.”11 Two weeks later these practices were questioned in 
a letter to Stalin from the chairman of the board of the Siberian Krai12 Agricultural Bank, S. I. 
Zagumenny, in which he warns of the dangers of this approach. Zagumenny wrote that, “I am 
firmly convinced that the bulk of middle and poor peasants will view putting the kulaks on trial 
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just for failing to sell grain as nothing other than a return, in one form or another, to the times of 
war communism and the period of forced grain requisitioning [prodrazvyorstka].”13 Zagumenny 
was only projecting his opinion of what might happen, but his letter pointed out the similarity 
between the agricultural plans Stalin endorsed and War Communism as towns were expected to 
fill state grain quotas through collective farms and appropriating it from the kulak class. What 
Zagumenny feared was that these new measures would alienate the lower strata of peasantry who 
still resented War Communism, which in turn would have negative effects on the peasantry’s 
willful involvement in their role with industrializing the country. Zagumenny’s letter displayed 
an early form of resistance to Stalin’s basic view of the economy and challenged the treatment of 
the peasants from within the party by officials responsible for the areas where these strategies 
were being carried out. 
 The ill reception that these plans received among the peasantry can be seen through an 
examination of letters written to members of Red Army units. An OGPU report on the attitudes 
of peasants writing to Red Army soldiers revealed that the peasantry began to experience 
hardships in regions that were being subjected to the agricultural policies Stalin promoted. One 
family’s correspondence read, “[y]ou write that service has become easy for you and life is good, 
but for us, our dear son-in-law, life has gotten very bad. They’ve started taking away grain from 
the rich for the treasury, and they’re forcing them to sell it at fixed prices…Flour now costs 3 
rubles, so that they’re pushing every citizen into taking grain out of the area.”14 This mass 
exodus of food and the ill reception of the grain procurement plans Stalin championed in 1928 
caused much unrest among the people closely tied to the rural communities as this account 
reflects. When coupled with the fears of Zagumenny it became clear that Stalin’s agricultural 
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strategy ran the risk of alienating the peasantry, which was a point that Stalin would soon be 
confronted on with political opposition from high ranking party members. 
 Bukharin detested the new direction that Stalin, his old comrade in defending NEP, was 
taking the peasant economy. This political split led the right wing of the Bolshevik party to be 
labeled the Right Opposition by Stalin and his supporters who felt Bukharin and the rightists’ 
economic views posed opposition to the central party line. The Right Opposition would stand out 
as one of the greatest challenges to Stalin’s hegemonic rule over Soviet policy making. Although 
the Right Opposition questioned the departure from NEP in all realms of economic and social 
spheres, the greatest grievance they had surrounded an aberration to Stalin’s agriculture plans. In 
order to understand the way that Stalin’s attempts at grain requisitioning evolved into wide 
spread discontent among some high ranking members within the Politburo it is important to 
revisit the specific fears and challenges experienced by the people affected by the grain 
requisitions and Zagummeny. 
 By the summer of 1928 the problems forecast earlier in the year by Zagumenny and 
witnessed by Red Army soldiers would come to fruition. The USSR’s deputy people’s 
commissar of finance M. I. Frumkin would be the first high ranking official to sound the alarm. 
In a letter from Frumkin to the Politburo and Stalin in June of 1928, Frumkin revealed that, 
“[t]he deterioration in our domestic situation is attributable above all to the countryside, to the 
agricultural situation…the countryside, with the exception of a small segment of poor peasants, 
is against us.”15 Frumkin blamed the domestic shortcomings squarely on the problems with the 
agricultural plan that Stalin championed. He also revealed that much fallout manifested among 
the peasantry over the new grain procurement plans from every segment of peasant society, not 
just from the intentionally targeted kulak class.  
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 Frumkin’s call to the supporters of the new form of requisitioning grain was in his words 
an attempt to “call the Politburo’s attention to the factors that are the focus of hundreds and 
thousands of party members.”16 Perhaps this widespread concern was an overstatement by 
Frumkin, but even if the number of party members disenchanted by the agricultural policies 
championed by Stalin were embellished, the fact that Stalin and his supporters faced political 
opposition because of the central party line concerning agriculture was apparent. Frumkin did not 
hesitate to describe the negative effect these practices had on the peasantry and on the entire 
economy as well. He wrote that, “[a]ny incentive to improve a farm, to increase the inventory of 
working animals or equipment, or commercial livestock, is paralyzed by the fear of being listed 
as a kulak.”17 The point that Frumkin made was that not only were the measures Stalin supported 
destructive in fostering a positive relationship between the peasantry and the rest of society, but 
this alienation actually posed a serious threat to the economy. There had already been concern 
over eliminating incentive to produce goods through the destruction of NEP, but Frumkin took 
this argument a step further and actually described Stalin’s treatment of the kulaks as providing a 
disincentive for peasants to be productive in the agricultural sector. Frumkin’s letter was a direct 
contestation of Stalin’s agriculture policy and revealed the political unrest among party members 
concerned about the state of social and economic relations in the Soviet Union almost 
immediately after the agricultural policies Stalin endorsed were implemented in Siberia and 
spread to the Ural region. 
 Another way that Frumkin contested Stalin’s political hegemony was by proposing 
solutions to the problems in the countryside that went against the policies adopted by Stalin and 
his supporters. Frumkin suggested that the central policies should “not expand state farms on an 
intensive [udarny] and superintensive [sverkhudarny] basis. This intensive way of operating will 
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be costly.”18 Frumkin suggested that the plan of procuring grain and moving the entire peasantry 
onto collective farms should take a temperate and methodical path, which would be a position 
that political opposition to Stalin would embrace throughout the collectivization campaigns. 
Frumkin’s letter in 1928 outlined some shortcomings with the central party line and revealed that 
even by midsummer Stalin was being faced with opposition from within the political apparatus 
due in large measure to the agricultural policies he supported. The issues raised by Frumkin 
directly confronted the plan championed by Stalin and would also become a major platform that 
the Right Opposition would endorse. 
 By July, Bukharin outlined the basic grievances the Right Opposition had with this 
reorganization of Soviet economic strategies. Although most of the points that Bukharin focused 
on surrounded the agricultural policies supported by Stalin, the Right Opposition also felt that 
the rapid rate of industrialization as a whole had been an unrealistic program. Bukharin stated 
that, “[w]e want to accomplish a whole host of important tasks overnight…It is not hard to 
understand that, first, in this formulation these tasks cannot be fulfilled simultaneously.”19 This 
endorsement of a temperate approach to moving the country forward would lead Bukharin and 
the Right Opposition into direct conflict with Stalin surrounding his plans to rapidly procure 
grain supplies. Furthermore, it would set Bukharin and the Right Opposition up as a major hurdle 
for Stalin’s plans concerning the entire economic policy he endorsed. 
 Bukharin noted in his speech in July that, “last year we exported 227 million rubles’ 
worth of grain and fed everybody, this year we not only did not export anything, but in addition 
we are experiencing the most brutal signs of under consumption in a whole host of areas.”20 The 
problems with the agricultural agenda that Stalin championed led to two dependent areas of 
concern for Bukharin and the rightists. The first was the alienating factor that the new 
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agricultural policy had on every stratum of the peasantry. Bukharin stated that, “Lenin wrote that 
the main task of our CC and Central Control Commission, as well as our party as a whole, was to 
prevent these disagreements from growing to the degree of ‘serious class based 
disagreements.’”21 To Bukharin and the Right Opposition the problem was that the draconian 
measures that were championed by Stalin led to poor economic policy and a division between 
the peasantry and the rest of society. Bukharin’s understanding at this point was that these 
policies forced the state to enact measures that would not only harm the peasantry, but also by 
subverting Lenin’s strategy with NEP, the economy as a whole. 
 A second major point of focus for Bukharin was on the property confiscations that were 
being carried out against kulaks and speculators in order to ensure more grain reserves. Bukharin 
described the similarities these had to War Communism by stating that, “[d]uring the program 
debate we just defined war communism as a system that sets the goal of rational consumption 
with a curtailment of individualist incentive for the small scale producer, with requisitions, 
confiscations and so forth.”22 According to Bukharin these measures not only alienated the 
peasantry from the proletariat, but also removed any incentive the peasantry would have to 
produce the proper amount of agricultural goods needed for the state to maintain an international 
presence and also provide for its citizens domestically. Although these were not the only issues 
that the Right Opposition had concerning the rapid rate of industrialization that was being 
pursued by Stalin and his supporters in the Soviet government, they did reveal that the 
agricultural strategies supported by Stalin in 1928 had opened Stalin and his supporters up to 
wide spread political opposition. 
Nevertheless, in the winter of 1928/29 the method that had been implemented in the 
Siberian and Ural regions and promoted by the CC earlier in the year, which relied on town 
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councils fulfilling grain requirements by expropriating grain from kulaks and encouraging the 
collectivization of agriculture, spread throughout the Soviet Union and became known as the 
Ural-Siberian method. With the expansion of the Ural-Siberian method peasant communities 
began to experience measures similar to War Communism throughout the Soviet Union, which 
would largely reshape the structure of the peasant’s way of life. In 1929 when the plans put into 
practice in the countryside began to spread, the implementation of such practices also began to 
be questioned in the political sphere. It was merely an extension of the policies that Stalin and his 
supporters promoted in 1928 and although the rightists questioned these plans and the expansion 
of them, a much more influential and subtle political give and take would ensue surrounding the 
proliferation of the Ural-Siberian method. The resentment for the kulaks and reversal of the free 
market policies of NEP would remain, but exactly how to allow peasant communities to extract 
grain from those labeled kulaks would prove controversial. 
 Although the rightists felt that the procurement campaign and the harsh penalties levied 
against kulaks moved too fast and threatened to upset the cooperation between the peasantry and 
the proletariat, many local officials favored harsher reprisals and a rapid tempo. This debate 
unfolded by May of 1929. A telegram from the RSFSR Commissariat of Justice revealed the 
penalties that the central party felt should be extracted by law against kulaks. It stated that, “[i]n 
the event that [grain] delivery is not made, the repressive measure to be imposed is a levy 
equivalent to double the amount of grain [owed], with the subsequent sale of the individuals 
property.”23 These measures that would be exacted against the real or perceived kulaks that were 
accused of withholding grain were immediately challenged by local officials.  
A telegram from A. A. Andreev, secretary of the Northern Caucus Krai party committee 
to Stalin, following the telegram outlining legal repercussions, revealed the way local party 
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officials were pushing for heavier punishments. Andreev outlined his desire to allow “a fine to be 
imposed by the commissions, based on a resolution of citizens’ meetings, at five times the value 
[of the amount owed].”24 This split between the legal requirements, the central party figures, and 
the desires of local party officials underscored another way that the plans for grain procurement 
and punishing kulaks were facing resistance. In a complete reversal of the rightist positions, by 
May of 1929 Stalin was presented with local officials who felt the central party agricultural 
agenda was too modest. 
The insistence by local officials that the agricultural policies were not harsh enough 
would be accepted by Stalin and his supporters. A decree from the RSFSR Central Executive 
Committee and Sovnarkom in June of 1929 revealed that they would allow local soviets “[t]o 
impose a fine on an administrative basis in the amount of up to five times the obligations set by 
the resolution of a general assembly or commission of a village soviet, and in the event of 
refusal, to auction off property.”25 This decree described how the grievances of local officials 
won out and the harsh reprisals against speculators and kulaks would be accepted. The triumph 
of the local officials in their contestation of central policy embodied the repressive measures that 
would continue to disenfranchise many peasants and cement the agricultural policies that Stalin 
championed throughout the grain producing regions of the Soviet Union. 
Also by 1929 many people within the Soviet government were trying to discredit the 
Right Opposition, which caused Bukharin to confront Stalin in harsher terms. In a declaration 
Bukharin made to the Politburo in January of 1929 defending himself, Rykov and Tomskii 
against slander, the Right Opposition’s confrontation with Stalin’s control over the agricultural 
plans of the state became apparent. Bukharin denounced “the pithy catchword of 
‘tribute’…Connected with it is the subsequent change in the taxation of the peasantry, the 
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growing difficulties with the supply of bread, the reduction in the sown area, and the 
dissatisfaction of the peasantry…no one can say a word against the ‘tribute’ because Comrade 
Stalin has pronounced this word.”26 There is a lot that one can discern regarding the controversial 
nature of the agricultural policies Stalin endorsed and the way these facilitated resistance through 
this statement. For example, Bukharin continued to criticize Stalin’s understanding of the 
problems developing regarding grain supplies among the peasantry. However, this declaration 
also revealed the shortcomings of Bukharin and the Right Opposition. Although the rightists had 
legitimate claims surrounding the inadequacies of Stalin’s plans, they were unable to garner 
enough support to actually challenge this system. As Bukharin notes, the rightists were the only 
ones willing to seriously challenge these policies due to the reverence many party members had 
for Stalin. 
 Bukharin’s cries of injustice did not necessarily sum up the way that the Politburo 
supported Stalin alone. Lars Lih, Oleg Naumov, and Oleg Khlevniuk state that, “[i]n spite of the 
political defeat of the ‘rightists’ in April 1929 at both the plenum of the Central Committee and 
the XVI Party Conference, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii preserved some authority in the 
party—state apparat. All of them remained members of the Politburo.”27 By this time the mere 
disagreement over Stalin’s policies did not lead to automatic banishment from the party. 
However, Stalin had his own group of supporters that would insulate him from any serious 
challenge posed by the rightists. By November of 1929 Bukharin was expelled from the 
Politburo, and Rykov and Tomskii were removed from the Politburo the following year.28 These 
expulsions and the fear that Stalin had surrounding these members of the Politburo did not 
necessarily rely solely on their opposition to his agricultural policies, but the opposition these 
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figures posed to the agricultural policies Stalin endorsed played a major role in their alienation 
within the party. 
Upon examining some of Stalin’s letters to Molotov, his most trusted follower, it 
becomes clear that the rightist’s opposition to the agricultural policies Stalin endorsed were an 
ever present concern for Stalin during 1929. There is also evidence that Stalin truly felt that 
Bukharin had no grounds for confronting his approach to agriculture. In a letter written in August 
of 1929 Stalin wrote that, “[t]he main problem with grain procurement at present is 1) the 
presence of a large number of urban speculators at or near the grain market who take the 
peasants’ grain away from the government…3) the desire of a whole number of collective farms 
to hide grain surpluses and sell grain on the side.”29 As this statement disclosed, Stalin thought 
that the problem with the new agricultural policy did not stem from poor central policy that 
alienated peasants or dissipated the incentive to produce, but rather hinged on a number of 
greedy local peasants and officials. This was in stark contrast to Bukharin and the rightist’s 
analysis that the problems surrounding grain procurement rested on the tenets of the central party 
line and outlined the sharp difference in these group’s positions. 
 Another letter that Stalin wrote to Molotov displayed his optimism surrounding the 
agricultural policies he championed. Stalin wrote that, “procurements are now going well…The 
main thing now is not to rest on our laurels and to move things forward.”30 This optimism was 
not completely revealing of Stalin’s attitude and an earlier letter demonstrated that he still had 
some resolve to discredit Bukharin and the Right Opposition. Stalin wrote, “Bukharin has slid 
into the swamp of opportunism…why does he praise Lenin so much now after his death?”31 
Stalin’s criticism of Bukharin seems typical of disagreeing politicians, but the focus of his 
argument is enlightening. One main point that it emphasized was that Stalin either disagreed with 
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or feared the legitimacy of Bukharin’s claim that his policies went against Lenin’s wishes. Either 
way, the letter showed that Bukharin’s criticism of Stalin and his insistence on the problems with 
Stalin’s grain procurement strategies were concerning for Stalin well into 1929. 
Nevertheless, the collective farm movement began to increase due to peasants joining 
collective farms in the last few months of 1929. This increase largely consisted of poor peasants 
and had much to do with local officials forcing them onto collective farms or peasants simply 
joining collective farms to ensure they would not be labeled kulaks. When viewed in this light 
the rise in collective farm populations could hardly be seen as due to voluntary actions of the 
peasantry, but party officials and Stalin described the increase in collective farm populations as 
such. R.W. Davies and S. G. Wheatcroft estimate that, “in the last three months of 1929,…about 
three million households joined the kolkhozy.”32 This figure was touted by Stalin as an example 
of widespread support for collectivization among the peasantry and caused Stalin’s attitude to 
change dramatically by the fall and winter of 1929. In a letter to Molotov in December of 1929 
Stalin retained a denunciatory tone concerning the rightists and optimism over collectivization. 
Stalin wrote that, “grain procurements are progressing… The collective farm movement is 
growing by leaps and bounds…The rightists (the three) are working away, but so far they 
haven’t made a move.”33 The light hearted nature of Stalin in these letters displayed his optimism 
surrounding grain procurements and collectivization, but also demonstrated the lack of fear he 
had of the rightists. Stalin kept an eye on the Right Opposition, but his optimism surrounding the 
success of the grain procurements of 1929 seemed to have alleviated his fear that Bukharin may 
pose a serious threat surrounding the issue of agriculture. This, coupled with the growing size of 
the collective farms, led Stalin and the Politburo to begin to consider a plan to implement full 
scale forced collectivization. 
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The optimism of many party officials and the forward looking plans towards wholesale 
collectivization were contained in a report by G. N. Kaminsky. Kaminsky wrote that: 
[W]e must categorically declare that we have achieved major successes in the 
task of socialist reorganization of the countryside thanks to consistent 
implementation of the party’s general line. The party did this work in spite of the 
rightists, against them, in conflict with them, and only steady, firm 
implementation of the party line will be able to guarantee us new successes in the 
future. The party in the future will do even more vigorous work in the 
collectivization of agricultural production, based on the rapid pace and large 
scale of the collective[-farm] movement, and will strive to achieve even greater 
success.34  
The defeat of the rightists left little in the way of opposition to rapid collectivization by the 
winter of 1929. Also the vigor of the party officials to pursue wholesale collectivization pushed 
the Soviet government towards finalizing plans on how to achieve this collectivization and how 
to ensure its success. Ultimately, this would set the stage for a debate within the Politburo that 
would once again question the viability of Stalin’s optimistic tenacity. 
Despite the vigor of Stalin’s speeches and other party officials concerning the success of 
the agricultural policies of 1929 an examination of the discussions concerning how to pursue full 
scale collectivization within the CC reveals that controversy over the practicality of the plans 
Stalin championed also developed. The CC draft decree on the pace of collectivization on 
December 18th 1929 contained the focus that was supported by many members of the CC 
concerning the methods that would lead to full scale collectivization. The decree stated that, “the 
task of collectivizing the vast majority of peasant farms may be completely fulfilled within five 
years.”35 The decree of the CC was the plan that would be debated throughout the rest of 
December and into January from various positions that contradicted and supported Stalin’s view 
of the rate collectivization should be pursued. Another element of the CC decree was the 
continuation of the campaign against the kulak. As the decree stated, “resistance by the kulak has 
become all the more rabid and fierce as he now directly confronts the prospect of his destruction 
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as a class in the Soviet system.”36 This focus on the problems that kulaks posed to 
collectivization would later become a point of contention, but with the political defeat of the 
Right Opposition the debate within the CC would overlook this element of the CC decree and 
battle lines were drawn primarily over the rate at which collectivization would be forced on the 
peasantry. 
Although a five year plan did allow for some time to help collective farms come into 
fruition, there were some within the CC that felt this rate was still too rapid. The main resistance 
to the plans that Stalin would come to support and the primary concerns over this rate of 
collectivization are contained in a report by the first secretary of the Middle Volga party 
organization, M. M. Khataevich. He noted that, “[w]e must not get preoccupied with speeding up 
the pace, but at the same time there must be no artificial slow down.”37 Khataevich’s analysis 
was a long way from the rightist’s direct confrontation of the agricultural policies adopted by the 
Soviet government. However, his reluctance to endorse the strict and somewhat rapid timetables 
outlined in the CC decree resembled the warnings of Frumkin who felt rapid collectivization 
would cause economic problems and revealed the disagreement that party members still had 
surrounding setting a rapid pace for collectivization. Khataevich’s concern over the CC decree 
did not necessarily contradict rapid collectivization strategies, but he did propose that this focus 
on numbers and rapid progress may prove harmful for the Soviet Union. 
By the time Stalin weighed in on this issue it became clear that he disagreed with the CC 
decree because its plans were too modest of an approach and certainly disagreed with 
Khataevich’s warnings against pursuing rapid collectivization. Stalin described his view in a 
telegram to Molotov where he stated that, “[w]e are planning to shorten the resolution by 75 to 
80 percent…and to lay a shorter deadline for collectivizing the principle grain areas.”38 Stalin’s 
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view of the rate wholesale collectivization should be pursued was clear. He supported a plan that 
would ensure the most rapid rate for full scale collectivization. Again Stalin took the hard line as 
he did against the Right Opposition and criticisms surrounding punishment for kulaks. 
The final plan that was settled on by the Politburo would satisfy Stalin’s wishes. The final 
decree on the pace of collectivization was finalized on January 5, 1930. It declared that, “the 
collectivization of such highly important grain areas as the Lower Volga, the Middle Volga, and 
the Northern Caucasus can be completed for the most part in the fall of 1930 or, at the latest, in 
the spring of 1931; the collectivization of other grain areas can be completed for the most part in 
the fall of 1931 or, at the latest, in the spring of 1932.”39 The final decree of the CC on the plans 
for compulsory collectivization demonstrated Stalin’s triumph over a political struggle that had 
begun three years earlier. This transition to collective agriculture and away from the limited free 
market system allowed by NEP marked a shift within the Soviet Union which would not end 
with this decree that solidified the position that Stalin supported. Furthermore, rapid 
collectivization as official party policy and the Unified position of the CC at this point in history 
had little effect on the tribulations these policies would cause in the future. 
 The new system that Stalin and the CC supported required a vast reorganization of party 
positions, which soon caused wide spread resistance among lower level political figures. For 
example, “[i]n Vladivostok out of 249 assigned to be transferred only 169 were given moving 
vouchers; the others showered the okrug [party] committee with petitions with all sorts of 
certificates attached about ailments, etc., doing everything possible to avoid going to a raion.”40 
The idea of moving to a distant raion41 was obviously unpopular among many political officials 
who refused to leave their former positions to help implement compulsory collectivization 
among the peasantry. The shift in political responsibilities and the resistance of lower level 
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officials to comply revealed the distance between the central party members and the mood 
among the lower ranking local members of the government at this transitory point in Soviet 
history. 
 The grievances of lower party officials displayed mild political resistance to the 
collectivization plans that were being implemented, but the peasantry would soon face much 
greater hardships than being forced to a government post in a distant raion. This would manifest 
as a plan to forcefully collectivize agriculture would exclude kulaks in a way that posed a serious 
threat to a large number of the peasantry. A Politburo decree on January 30, 1930 outlined how 
kulaks should be dealt with. The decree separated the kulaks into three classes with drastically 
different punishments attached to each category. They instructed that: 
 Category 1—immediately liquidate the counterrevolutionary kulak aktiv elements by 
incarcerating them in concentration camps, not stopping at the death penalty for 
organizers of terrorist acts, counterrevolutionary disturbances, and insurrerectionist 
organizations; b. Category 2—should be comprised of remaining elements of the kulak 
aktiv, especially the richest kulaks and quasi-landowners, who are to be exiled to remote 
localities of the USSR and, within the borders of a given region, to remote areas of the 
region; C. Category 3—consists of kulaks who are left within the borders of a given 
raion; they are to be resettled on new land plots allotted to them outside collective 
farms.42 
 
What is clear from the Politburo decree is that kulaks would not be allowed to participate in the 
collective farms and would face harsh reprisals for the status imbued on them by the state. It is 
also around the time that these practices were being implemented that the actual existence of a 
kulak class began to be questioned. As officials from the city centers were sent out to villages to 
extract punishments against these kulaks the realization that the intended targets of the campaign 
were far from being rich began to take hold. This was remedied by the state when the “central 
party apparatus imaginatively introduced a special category of Sub-kulaks who were poor but yet 
opposed to the government.”43 These measures ensured that a wide range of peasants could be 
targeted by the state and increased the elasticity of the term kulak. When coupled with the list of 
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punishments depending on what category of kulak an accused person would be placed in the 
focus on attacking kulaks, which became known as dekulakization, embodied a form of wide 
spread state terror against the peasantry to ensure peasants would join collective farms. 
The forced collectivization campaign endorsed by the CC and the fear many peasants had 
of being labeled kulaks led to a massive increase in collective farm populations. Davies and 
Wheatcroft estimate that between January and February of 1930, “nearly ten million households 
were dragooned into kolkhozy.”44 However, the all around implementation of collectivizing 
agriculture along with the attack on the kulaks caused many problems among the peasantry. The 
lack of popularity these policies had among the peasantry can be seen through an increase in 
mass disturbances among the peasantry in the first few months of 1930. A report by the OGPU 
on mass disturbances in the countryside revealed that in January there were 102 mass 
disturbances by February 1,048 and in March there were 6,532.45 The unrest among the 
peasantry displayed the lack of support the central party line had among the peasantry almost 
immediately after the plan to instate rapid compulsory collectivization throughout the Soviet 
Union became accepted as central party policy. 
The unrest among the peasantry that came with compulsory collectivization and the harsh 
treatment of the kulaks forced Stalin to address these issues not long after this agricultural 
campaign ensued. Stalin did so on March 2, 1930 in an article which appeared in the 
authoritative central party newspaper Pravda entitled, “Dizzy with Success.” Stalin described the 
shortcomings that rapid collectivization caused “as a result of the block-headed belief of a 
section of our party: ‘We can achieve anything!’ ‘There’s nothing we can’t do!’.”46 Stalin’s 
ability to shirk the responsibility for the pitfalls of rapid collectivization became the most 
innovative solution to the problems of dissenting opinions over agriculture Stalin would develop. 
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As his article said, the problem did not rest on the overzealous central party line that he had 
championed, but rather on local party officials that were ‘dizzy with success’ and impassioned 
by the cry of the socialization of the agricultural sector. Stalin’s “Dizzy with Success” article was 
accompanied by the central party reducing the intensity of forced collectivization and 
dekulakization, which also helped to quell the unrest in the countryside and remove political 
pressure from Stalin. 
In addition to Stalin dodging the responsibility for the unpopular campaigns during the 
first forced collectivization and dekulakization drives of 1930 the Right Opposition provided a 
series of forced recantations served to ensure that the party line, which Stalin had engineered, 
would be seen as a homogenous agricultural outline. Bukharin’s recantation in December of 
1930 revealed the strong focus these denouncements would have on the agricultural policies 
Stalin endorsed. Bukharin began by disavowing the rightist coalition altogether by stating that he 
regrets, “the fundamental mistakes committed by a group of comrades, to whom I myself once 
belonged.”47 His denunciation of the Right Opposition would contain the role that this opposition 
played in confronting the agricultural policies being implemented by Stalin and his proponents. 
A broad recantation would not suffice, however, as Bukharin goes on to say that, “[i]t was the 
crushing of a class enemy, of the kulak capitalist stratum, the process of a transition to total 
collectivization of the poor-middle peasant, petty peasant economy…and the party’s relentless 
and determined pursuit of the general line that gave us victory.”48 The matter of whether 
Bukharin truly believed that the position of the rightists was erroneous or that his recantation was 
an outgrowth of the fact that by this time the Right Opposition had been crushed politically did 
little to deduce from the focus this recantation had on the success of the agriculture policies 
instated by the party earlier in the year. Bukharin’s recantation demonstrated that by 1930 
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political resistance had become very minimal and the only way that any member of the 
government, including Bukharin, could hope to continue service in that government would be to 
support the party line in regards to agriculture. Bukharin was willing to do so, but that did not 
signal an end to the political fallout over the forced collectivization and dekulakization 
campaigns that were being implemented. 
There is also some evidence that Stalin himself felt that any of the punishments levied 
against peasants who would detract from the goal of collectivization was necessary. In 
September Stalin wrote to Molotov stating that, “[w]e must immediately publish all the 
testimonies of all the wreckers of the supplies of meat, fish, tinned goods and vegetables…and 
after a week have the OGPU announce that all these scoundrels will be executed by firing squad. 
They should all be shot.”49 The focus on punishing people who got in the way of central policy 
concerning collectivization by death would be an issue that caused trouble within the 
government in the future. However, the question of how to legitimate the treatment of kulaks 
remained a concern of Stalin and his supporters throughout a second wave of forced 
collectivization and dekulakization that occurred in the early months of 1931. 
The unrest among the peasants had been pacified by Stalin’s retreat from the rapid rate of 
collectivization and dekulakization in the beginning of 1930. Furthermore, the tumultuous and 
large scale agricultural policies of 1930 did little to hinder that year’s harvest and with the help 
of good weather the Soviet agricultural sector observed a record harvest. This successful harvest 
renewed the Soviet government’s confidence in the viability of full scale collectivization and a 
second wave of forced collectivization would prove less contentious as a demoralized peasantry 
were forced into collective farms. Davies and Wheatcroft estimate that, “[n]early four million 
households joined the kolkhozy in the first three months of 1931, and a further 2.5 million in 
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April and May.”50 The agricultural success experienced after the first collectivization drive 
would not transfer to the second. Lazar Kaganovich, who was a member of the Politburo and 
Stalin’s deputy in the party revealed in a letter to Stalin in September of 1931 that, “[e]ven 
though the total amount of procurements is much greater than last year…the procurements now 
are apparently going to be more of a strain, and management of this issue will have to be 
strengthened.”51 No longer was it sufficient to blame shortcomings on local party officials or the 
kulak and by 1931 inconsistencies in the plan of rapid compulsory collectivization were 
beginning to develop.  
The political atmosphere of 1931 can be seen in Stalin’s concern for legitimizing the 
harsh treatment of kulaks during the dekulakization campaigns to the rest of the party. Stalin’s 
focus on contextualizing the treatment of the kulaks to the rest of the party is discussed in a letter 
from Stalin to Molotov. Stalin questioned a speech Molotov was to give at the VI Congress of 
Soviets when he stated that, “I read only the part about ‘dumping’ and ‘forced’ labor… 
Regarding the kulaks’ labor, since they are not convicts, either they should not be mentioned at 
all, or we should explain in a special section and with thorough documentation that the only ones 
who work among the kulaks are those who want to work and [that they do so] with all the rights 
of voluntary labor.”52 Stalin’s defense of the cruel treatment of kulaks as deserved and also not 
resulting in forced labor was an attempt by Stalin to ensure that Molotov’s speech would justify 
these draconian practices to the rest of the party. The mere need to address this issue displayed 
Stalin’s political insecurity surrounding his policies against the kulaks in 1931. Furthermore, this 
political insecurity was compounded by the failures in agriculture, which were preludes to what 
would come and by 1932 Stalin would again face extensive opposition due to the agricultural 
policies he endorsed. 
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 The year 1932 brought widespread famine to the Soviet Union due to the central party 
policies concerning agriculture. Ukraine was especially susceptible to this famine and Stalin 
misjudged the situation in Ukraine from the beginning. Stalin revealed his ignorance on the issue 
in a letter to Kaganovich. He wrote that, “Ukraine has been given more than it should get. There 
is no reason to give it more grain—and there is nowhere to take it from.”53 Stalin was responding 
to pleas by local officials for the Soviet government to alleviate the starvation that was occurring 
in epic proportions in Ukraine throughout 1932. Stalin’s indifference to the cries of local 
officials led him to oppose their suggestions. In a rare case for the Soviet leader this 
misunderstanding of the crisis in Ukraine led him to reveal to Kaganovich in August that, 
“[u]nless we begin to straighten out the situation in the Ukraine, we may lose the Ukraine.”54 The 
pleas from the local officials, although contradictory to what Stalin felt was necessary, did not 
pose any sort of political threat to central policy. However, as Stalin’s correspondence in 1932 
demonstrated, the misunderstanding of the crisis in Ukraine and his inability to agree with local 
officials led to a catastrophe so large that Stalin had to question his ability to keep Ukraine in the 
Soviet Union. 
 The Ukrainian crisis was just one political problem that Stalin faced in 1932. Much 
controversy was also created within the party surrounding a law, “said to have been drafted by 
Stalin personally,”55 instated on 7 august 1932 concerning theft of public property. The law 
sought to end unlawful consumption of state food reserves by starving peasants through allowing 
the state to punish theft of various public property in a way that required, “execution with 
confiscation of all property, with commutation of execution under extenuating circumstances to 
deprivation of freedom for a term not less than 10 years with confiscation of all property.”56 
When considering the poor state of food reserves in the country by 1932 due to the aggressive 
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collectivization policies being instated it was not surprising to party officials that theft of state 
food supplies occurred on a fairly large scale. However, the way that Stalin sought to remedy this 
problem was shocking. A threat of execution or ten year imprisonment was an extreme sentence 
for theft of property and again Stalin’s harsh line would draw dissenting opinion from members 
of the government. 
 This dissent came from within the Politburo and was recorded in a letter from L. M. 
Kaganovich to Stalin. Kaganovich wrote that, “[t]here was one objection to the third section 
yesterday by…[sic] today he wasn’t there he went out of town. There were also doubts about and 
even objections about the second and third…but ultimately we settled on this text in principle.”57 
Although Kaganovich did not provide any names, it was clear that multiple members of the 
Politburo opposed the sections of Stalin’s law that required strict penalties for theft of state 
property. The objections of many members of the Politburo did little to soften the repressive 
measures instituted by the decree, but the opposition to it displayed resistance to Stalin’s 
agricultural policies from within the Politburo as late as 1932. 
 The year 1932 also brought criticism of Stalin’s agricultural policies from M. N. Riutin, a 
former district secretary who affiliated with the Right Opposition and was expelled from the 
party in 1930. Stalin had an inclination that Riutin would pose a problem as a letter he wrote to 
Molotov in 1930 revealed. Stalin wrote that, “[w]ith regard to Riutin, it seems to me that it’s 
impossible to limit ourselves to expelling him from the party…he will have to be exiled 
somewhere as far as possible from Moscow.”58 Stalin was correct about Riutin in 1930 and by 
1932 Riutin would provide a scathing denunciation of Stalin and his policies in a document 
entitled “Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship,” more commonly known as the 
Riutin Platform. With the help of his comrades within the party Riutin attempted to distribute it 
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to party members in secrecy. The Riutin Platform attacked Stalin with vitriolic language and 
sought to encourage party members to contest Stalin’s growing hegemony within the Soviet 
government. Although the number of party members who actually received the document is 
unknown, to Stalin it was clear that this document directly contested his power and confronted 
him within the political sphere. The Riutin Platform bluntly stated that, “Stalin sees no 
contradiction whatsoever between, on the one hand, his theory and, on the other hand, his 
pronouncements concerning the liquidation of kulaks as a class, the improvement in the material 
conditions of the middle and poor peasants, and the middle peasants irreversible coming around 
to socialism. And yet, in reality, they are mutually exclusive.”59 The focus of the Riutin Platform 
on the often contradictory nature of Stalin’s agricultural outlook and the reality of the situation 
for the peasants and the economy as a whole resembled a continuation of the Right Opposition 
platform. By 1932 it had become clear to Riutin that punishing the kulaks and building an 
alliance between the middle and the poor peasants and the rest of society through collectivization 
was proving impossible. Although the Riutin Platform was one of the last real political 
contestations to Stalin’s power, it did challenge Stalin’s growing power in the Soviet government 
largely by pointing to the failures of the agricultural policies that Stalin had endorsed. 
 By the end of 1932 and into 1933 the Eismont affair,60 which contained many high 
ranking members of the government, also posed a threat to Stalin in ways deemed by Stalin and 
his supporters to be similar to the Right Opposition. The claims against this group were 
contained in a speech by M. F. Shkiriatov, the chairman of the Middle Volga Territorial Control 
Commission (KK/RKI), at the CC plenum in January of 1933. Shkiriatov stated that Eismont’s 
group, “had a negative attitude to the party’s policy in agriculture, to those measures which we 
are utilizing against the class enemy, against the remnants of the kulaks, now liquidated…This 
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total harmony of views was shared by Smirnov, Eismont, and Tolmachev.”61 Although the 
Eismont affair was much more tempered and less confrontational than the Riutin plot or the 
Right Opposition, it did confront the party leadership with accusations by central party officials 
that Stalin’s agricultural plans were detrimental to the Soviet Union. By this time the party had 
become much more unified as M. F. Shkiriatov’s scathing denunciation of this group that 
deviated from the party line displayed. For this reason the example provided by the Eismont 
affair demonstrated that although political dissent was rather ineffectual by 1933, the agricultural 
plans that Stalin endorsed were still being confronted by many high ranking members within the 
government.  
 Eismont and Riutin were arrested for their contestation of the forced collectivization and 
dekulakization campaigns championed by Stalin, but there still existed wide spread and severe 
famine in the Soviet Union well into 1933. This led to more grass roots political upstarts that 
developed in opposition to the state merely because of the agricultural policies that were being 
implemented. This can be seen with a political party that called themselves “The People’s 
Communist Party.” M. F. Shkiriatov described this party’s platform in a memo to Kaganovich 
that stated, “[t]he objective of this counterrevolutionary organization was to overthrow Soviet 
power, the dissolution of the kolkhozy and the restoration of individual farming [edinolichnoye 
khoziaistvo] as the predominant form of agriculture.”62 The likelihood of this political 
organization of attaining its goal was minimal, but their goal was clear. Stalin’s agricultural 
policies had to be reversed at any cost. The goals of this party were more drastic than the other 
criticisms that merely sought to slow the rate of collectivization and their focus proved that 
although major forms of resistance had been reduced by the Soviet government, political 
resistance to these policies among the Soviet people in 1933 still remained. 
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 The final triumph of Stalin’s agricultural policies and the end to widespread resistance to 
collectivization could be seen as being achieved by 1934. Stalin’s “Congress of the Victors” 
speech revealed that, “[t]he majority of the adherents to these antirevolutionary groups had to 
admit that the line of the party was correct and they have capitulated to the party…The policy of 
eliminating the kulaks and of complete collectivization has triumphed.”63 The triumph of the 
collectivization campaign and the defeat of all opposition was no easy task and the battle that 
raged over the collectivization of Soviet agriculture within the party and beyond had lasted six 
years at the time of this speech. Although Stalin’s policies had triumphed, this long road was a 
testament to the struggle that collectivization was for the people involved, the politicians that 
opposed the party line and Stalin’s attempts to unilaterally instate Soviet policy. 
The full scale forced collectivization of agriculture and Stalin’s implementation of the 
agricultural policies he championed were contentious plans that only succeeded after he 
overcame a wide variety of political resistance. The origins of the agricultural debate can be 
traced to the period of NEP through the development of peasants profiting off of the free market, 
the ‘scissors crisis’ and the industrialization debate. By 1927 Stalin was ready to confront the 
shortcomings of NEP and instate an economic strategy that was all his own. Stalin’s agricultural 
plans would take over much of the economic platforms championed by the left wing of the 
Bolshevik party in the industrialization debate and focus on extracting resources from the 
peasantry through state control of agricultural practices. Almost immediately after Stalin’s trip to 
Siberia political resistance to these agricultural plans developed among party officials 
Zagumenny and Frumkin. The Right Opposition sympathized with earlier resistance, but posed 
more of a threat to Stalin because this resistance would include members of the Politburo. Less 
confrontational forms of resistance included dissenting opinions within the CC and even local 
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officials discontent with measures that they felt were too reserved. Nevertheless, Stalin’s forced 
collectivization strategy became accepted as the central party line in January of 1930. Although 
the implementation of widespread compulsory collectivization caused discontent among many 
peasants, Stalin’s “Dizzy with Success” article was able to shift the blame from himself to local 
party officials and solidify the party’s resolve by focusing on forced recantations from Bukharin 
regarding his criticism of the agricultural policies and the good harvests of 1930. However, this 
strategy did not eliminate political dissent altogether as famine gripped large regions of the 
Soviet Union in 1932 and 1933. Stalin’s unwillingness to heed the cry of local officials almost 
cost him Ukraine and even members of the Politburo questioned the harsh reprisals Stalin 
mandated against the peasants that he perceived as enemies of the state. The Riutin and Eismont 
affairs highlighted the dissatisfaction among many current and ex party members in 1932 and 
1933 and served as some of the last confrontations to Stalin’s supreme authority from within the 
government over forced collectivization. That did not mean that political resistance ceased 
altogether as grass roots political parties that were opposed to collectivization persisted, but the 
“Congress of the Victors” speech in 1934 marked an end to a contentious plan that completely 
transformed the agricultural landscape of the Soviet Union. Although Stalin’s policies won out 
over political opposition in nearly every case discussed above, the widespread discontent and 
political fallout over these agricultural plans demonstrate a political process ripe with debate and 
dissenting opinions that prove Stalin did not retain hegemonic influence over the party-state 






Glossary of terms and abbreviations in endnotes: 
Cheka Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia Komissiia Po Bor’be s Kontrrevoliutsiei, 
Spekuliatsiei i Sabotazhem (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for 
Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage [1928-1922]) 
CPSU(b) Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza (bolshevikov) (Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks]) 
OGPU Ob”edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (Unified State Political 
Administration [Political Police]) 
Okrug An Okrug was an administrative district that contained various townships, similar 
to a county. 
RTsKhIDNI Rossiiskii Tsentr dlya Khraneniya I Issledovaniya Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii 
(Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History) 
TsA FSB RF Tsentral'nyi Arkhiv Federal'noi Sluzhby Bezopasnosti Rossiyskaya Federatsiya 
(Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) 
TsK KPSS Tsentral’nyi Komitet Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)  
RGASPI Rossiski Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (Russian State 
Archive of Social and Political History) 
RGAE Rossiski Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (Russian State Archive of the 
Economy) 
RKP(b) Rossiiskaia Partiia Kommunistov (bolshevikov) (Russian Communist Party 
[Bolsheviks]) 
RGVA  Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenni Voennyi Arkhiv (Russian State Military Archive) 
RSFSR Rossiiskii Sovestskaia Federativnaia Sotsialistcheskaia Respublika (Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) 
VKP(b) Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bolshevikov) (All-Union Communist 
Party [Bolsheviks]) 
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